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Abstract
How should monetary policy be optimally designed in an environment with high degrees of
nancial globalization? To answer this question we lay down an open economy model where
net lending toward the rest of the world is constrained by a collateral constraint motivated by
limited enforcement. Borrowing is secured by collateral in the form of durable goods whose
accumulation is subject to adjustment costs. We demonstrate that, although this economy
can generate persistent current account decits, it can also deliver a stationary equilibrium.
The comparison between di¤erent monetary policy regimes (oating versus pegged) shows that
the impossible trinity is reversed: a higher degree of nancial globalization, by inducing more
persistent and volatile current account decits, calls for exchange rate stabilization. Finally, we
study the design of optimal (Ramsey) monetary policy. In this environment the policy maker
faces the additional goal of stabilizing exchange rate movements, which exacerbate uctuations
in the wedges induced by the collateral constraint. In this context optimality requires deviations
from price stability and calls for exchange rate stabilization.
JEL Codes: E52, F1.
Keywords: global imbalances, collateral constraints, monetary regimes.
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have been characterized by an extraordinary wave of nancial globalization
often accompanied with persistent current account imbalances1. For many countries current account
imbalances have been negatively related to booms in house price, mortgages and consumer credits
and durable demand. Since a signicant proportion of claims on consumers credit has been placed
in the international markets, for many countries the boom in durable demand has been mainly
nanced with foreign lending2. Lending standards have been in general quite loose along several
dimensions and overall they have been tied to collateral values, in a way that swings (upward or
downward) in durable prices (particularly house prices) have determined the amount of lending3.
Against this background many central banks around the world have followed, explicitly or
implicitly, ination targeting or price stability polices without putting any weight on asset or durable
prices and exchange rate movements. This is remarkable given that some countries had experienced
signicant exchange rate depreciations and asset price growth. We therefore ask whether the
prescriptions for monetary policy change in an environment as the one described above.
To this purpose we lay down a DSGE small open economy model in which agents consume
durable and non-durable goods4, supply labour services and nance consumption with foreign
lending. The rest of the world is populated by innite lived agents who behave as consumption
smoothers. Total (net) lending is constrained by a borrowing limit and is secured by collateral
in the form of durable stock, as the latter can be seized by lenders in the event of default. Due
to imperfect monitoring only a fraction of this collateral can be pledged by lenders. The type of
borrowing constraint considered is a collateral constraint on the line of Kiyotaki and Moore [46],
Kocherlacota [48], Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [23] among others. We further assume that durable
goods provide utility services (see Davis and Heatcote [29], Miles [64], Iacoviello [41], Campbell
1Backus, Henriksen, Lambert, Telmer [5] show that among industrialized countries the US, the UK, Spain and
Australia have run persistent current account decits.
2See Bernanke [15] for a discussion of the link between global imbalances and house price booms. He noticed
that countries whose current accounts have moved toward decit have generally experienced substantial housing
appreciation and increases in household wealth.
3The collateral policy practice adopted in the last two decades were quite risky as absence of any information
on future income streams the availability of lending is heavily dependent on the market swings. In many occasions
banks have renewed and replenished mortgages whenever the house price had gone up independently from the ability
of the borrower to repay.
4We assume that only non-durable goods are tradable and are aggregated through Armington aggregator.
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and Hercowitz [19] and Monacelli [65]) and that durable investment is subject to adjustment costs,
an assumption which allows to reproduce persistence in response to various shocks (see Topel
and Rosen [83], Erceg and Levin [33]). In this model net asset accumulation is determined by
the borrowing constraint and depends on the future value of collateral. The degree of nancial
globalization in this economy is captured by the parameter characterizing the sensitivity of foreign
lending to the value of collateral, as a higher value relaxes the constraint on foreign lending.
There are two production sectors in the domestic economy: the durable good sector and the non-
durable goods sector. Firms in both sectors are monopolistic competitive and face Rotemberg
[75] adjustment costs: this assumption is introduced to study non-neutral monetary policy and to
compare alternative monetary policy regimes. Monetary policy is conducted by means of Taylor
type rules.
Three results arise. First, we show that the net asset accumulation in this model is uniquely
determined in the steady state and that it is saddle path stationary in a neighborhood of the
steady state. A crucial assumption for this result is that foreign agents have higher discount rates
than domestic lenders. In this case the domestic economy experiences a persistent current account
decit, as in equilibrium domestic residents behave as impatient agents and borrow from the rest
of the world. Despite this, the current account decit leads to stationary dynamics. Second, we
compare alternative monetary policy regimes (oating versus pegged) under productivity, govern-
ment expenditure and global liquidity shocks and for alternative degrees of nancial globalization.
Our ndings show that the impossible trinity is reversed in this model: higher degree of nancial
liberalization exacerbate the destabilizing e¤ect of exchange rate uctuations on foreign debt, con-
sumption and output, hence it calls for more aggressive exchange rate targeting. Third, we analyze
the trade-o¤s faced by the policy maker in this environment and derive the optimal (Ramsey)
plan. The design of optimal policy is conducted in two steps. First, we lay down analytically
the conditions that characterize the constrained pareto optimal allocation for the model economy
under exible prices; this allows us to highlight the role of real wedges in our economy. Second, we
analyze the quantitative properties of the Ramsey plan for the economy with sticky prices. We nd
that monetary policy should deviate from price stability and smooth exchange rate uctuations,
the more so the higher the degree of nancial liberalization. The Ramsey planner faces a trade o¤
3
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between stabilizing domestic prices, both in the durable and the non-durable sector, as this serves
the goal of closing the price adjustment costs, and stabilizing uctuations in the exchange rate.
Movements in the latter, indeed, tend to amplify the uctuations of the wedges, induced by the
presence of the collateral constraint, on both, the marginal rate of substitution between durable and
non-durable consumption and the marginal rate of substitution between non-durable consumption
at two di¤erent dates. Through those channel, indeed, nancial globalization can amplify ine¢ cient
uctuations in consumption. The rst of those two goals is achieved by targeting solely domestic
ination, while the second requires exchange rate targeting. The second motive tends to prevail,
the more so in presence of increasing nancial openness.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 demonstrates
how to obtain a stationary equilibrium. Section 4 describes the transmission mechanism in this
model. Section 5 shows the comparison of alternative monetary policy regimes under alternative
degree of nancial liberalization. Section 6 shows the results of the optimal policy plan. Section 7
concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contains both positive and normative results and because of this it is related to several
strands of the literature.
In the open economy literature borrowing limits have been used to analyse various issues such
as sudden stops (see Mendoza [61], Chari et al. [22]), over-borrowing (see Uribe [84], Benigno et
al. [14]), global imbalances (see Mendoza et al. [63]), macroeconomic volatility (see Perri and
Quadrini [69]) and welfare gains from nancial integration (see Mendoza et al. [62], Aoki et al.
[2]). All those studies analyze borrowing constraints in RBC economies and do not analyze optimal
monetary policy. Additionally all those studies focus on borrowing constraints, in which physical
capital or other forms of pleadable income play the role of collateral. An exception is given by
Iacoviello and Minetti[42], who introduce in an RBC model a constraint with housing collateral to
explain output co-movements across countries. This paper, on the contrary, considers the role of
durable goods as collateral. The reason for the latter modeling assumption comes from the fact
that there is signicant evidence that consumersloans require the borrower to post some collateral
4
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and that housing or durable goods represent, in most economies, the largest form of collateral (see
Black et al. [17] and Attanasio et al. [4]).
In the open economy literature other papers have studied the e¤ects of nancial globalization
(see Broner and Ventura [18], Devereux and Sutherland [32]) and its link with monetary policy
(Devereux and Sutherland [32]). Most papers have modelled nancial globalization in the form of
international portfolio asset allocation, while we focus on collateral constrained lending.
The stabilization properties of alternative exchange rate regimes have been studied in sev-
eral other papers, which introduce nancial frictions in open economy models. For instance, See
Cespedes, Chang and Velasco [21], Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci [40], Faia [34] introduce a -
nancial accelerator mechanism in open economy and show that xed exchange rates can be more
destabilizing than oating exchange rates. Lahiri, Singh and Vegh [52] challenge the standard
Mundell-Fleming prescription by showing that in presence of segmented asset markets oating
exchange rate regimes perform better than xed exchange rates, when shocks are real, and vicev-
ersa, when shocks originate in the money market. Our paper shows that the introducing nancial
frictions in the form of collateral constraints consistently leads to a superiority of pegging the ex-
change rates, the reason being that uctuations in the exchange rate destabilize foreign lending
and, consequently, current account and consumption demand.
Our paper also analyzes the design of optimal monetary policy and the scope for exchange
rate targeting. In this respect our work is related to a strand of the open economy literature which
studies optimal monetary policy. The classical analysis in Clarida, Gali and Gertler [25] and Gali
and Monacelli [38] concludes that optimal monetary in a open economy models should target solely
producer price ination. The rationale for such an inward looking strategy comes from proving
the isomorphism between the competitive equilibrium relations characterizing the closed and the
open economy models. In this context the scope for exchange rate stabilization is absent. The
limited role for exchange rate targeting is conrmed in Devereux and Engel [31], who, by reviving a
popular argument due to Friedman [36], assert that in the presence of price stickiness, exchange rate
movements should be instrumental to have the economy replicate the allocation under purely exible
prices, which implies maintaining constant mark-ups. A motive for deviating from strict markup
stabilization generally lies in the possibility of strategically a¤ecting the terms of trade (the relative
5
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price of imports). A terms of trade variation, by altering domestic residentspurchasing power,
a¤ects consumption for any given level of output (labor e¤ort). Previous contributions, Corsetti and
Pesenti [27], Sutherland [82], Benigno and Benigno [12], have shown that this terms-of-trade motive
vanishes if either of two conditions holds: (i) the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported goods is unitary; (ii) that same elasticity coincides with the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption. More recently Faia and Monacelli [35] have shown that
in a small open economy with home bias the policy maker will optimally deviate from an inward
looking strategy and will target the exchange rate. Under home bias, variations in the terms of
trade induce also variations in the real exchange rate , which, in turn, a¤ect domestic consumption
via international risk-sharing (for any given level of foreign consumption). In the present paper,
we show that in an economy with incomplete international markets and collateral constraints on
external debt, there is an additional and independent motive for exchange rate targeting, namely
the need for stabilizing uctuations in external debt. Later indeed we show that exchange rate
movements exacerbate the uctuations on the wedges induced by the collateral constraint.
3 A Small Open Economy with Collateral Constraints
There is a small open economy (which we refer to as the domestic economy) and the rest of the
world. A crucial assumption in our set-up is that residents of the small open economy have lower
discount factors compared to agents populating the rest of the world. As domestic agents are
impatient, in equilibrium the small open economy will have a negative asset position; we will
return on this point later.
The small open economy is populated by innitely lived agents who consume non-durable and
durable goods, work, invest in domestic government claims and require loans to nance expendi-
tures. Consumption in durable and non-durable goods is nanced through foreign lending, which
takes the form of nonstate contingent securities and is bounded above by a fraction of the future
value of the collateral - i.e. durable goods. Because of this, the net asset position, both in the long
and in the short run, is linked to the future value of collateral. Demand for durable goods is justied
since they enter the utility function. The assumption of a nancially constrained open economy is
justied by the inability of foreign lenders to implement perfect monitoring. Under those circum-
6
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stances the tightness of the borrowing limit depends on the degree of information asymmetry, of
nancial market integration and of debt repossession ability which in turn depends upon legal and
institutional arrangements. There are two production sectors in this economy: the durable good
sector and the non-durable goods sector. Firms in both sectors are monopolistic competitive and
face Rotemberg [75] adjustment costs.
3.1 Domestic Households
Let st = fs0; ::::stg denote the history of events up to date t, where st denotes the event realization
at date t. The date 0 probability of observing history st is given by t. The initial state s
0
is given so that (s0) = 1: Henceforth, and for the sake of simplifying the notation, lets dene
the operator Etf:g 
P
st+1
(st+1jst) as the mathematical expectations over all possible states of
nature conditional on history st:
Agents maximize the following expected discounted sum of utilities:
Et
( 1X
t=0
tU(CI;t; Nt)
)
(1)
where total labour hours are denoted with Nt, total aggregate consumption is denoted by:
CI;t =
 
(1  ) 1C
 1

t + 
1


Dt
 1

! 
 1
(2)
where PI;t  [(1 )P 1 t +P 1 d;t ]
1
1  ; Pt is the aggregate price index for non-durable consumption
and Pd;t is the aggregate price index for durable consumption. Non-durable consumption is given
by a Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator of domestic and imported goods (with  being the
intratemporal elasticity):
Ct =


1
C
 1

h;t + (1  )
1
C
 1

f;t
 
 1
(3)
and durable consumption given by:

Dt = Dt 1    
2
(Xt   Dt 1)2
Dt 1
(4)
where Dt 1 is the real value of the stock of durable goods which is held in positive amount for it
generates utility, Xt = Dt   (1  )Dt 1 is investment in durable goods,  is the depreciation rate
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and the function  2 (
Xt Dt 1
Dt 1 )
2 represents an adjustment cost function. Preferences are concave,
bounded above and satisfy Inada conditions and  represents the discount factor of domestic
agents. As domestic residents are impatient we assume that  < ;with  being the discount factor
of foreign residents.
Afert dening Pt  [P 1 h;t +(1 )P 1 f;t ]
1
1  as the domestic price index and St =
Pf;t
Ph;t
as the
terms of trade; optimal demands for domestic and imported goods imply the following relation:
Ch;t
Cf;t
=

(1  )(St)
 (5)
The household receives at the beginning of time t a labor income of WtNt, where Wt is the
nominal wage. Agents can invest in domestic (nominal) government claims, Bt; which pay a gross
nominal interest rate one period later. Furthermore, they can borrow in foreign currency, Bt . The
gross nominal interest rate to be paid on foreign borrowing is given by Rnt : Agents can also buy and
sell durables, Dt; in an internal competitive market5. Agents are also owners of the monopolistic
sectors which produce durable and non-durable goods, hence they receive prots d;t and h;t.
The price of durable in terms of consumption goods is denoted Zt =
Pd;t
Pt
: Finally, agents pay lump
sum transfers,  t:
The sequence of budget constraints in nominal terms reads as follows:
PtCt Rnt 1Bt 1+etRn;t 1Bt 1+PtZt (Dt  Dt 1(1  )) WtNt Bt+etBt + t+h;t+d;t (6)
where et is the nominal exchange rate. It is now convenient to re-state the budget constraint
in real terms:
Ct  Rnt 1
bt 1
t
+Rn;t 1
et
et 1
bt 1
t
+Zt (Dt  Dt 1(1  )) = Wt
Pt
Nt   bt + bt +
 t
Pt
+
h;t
Pt
+
d;t
Pt
(7)
where et
Bt
Pt
= bt are real international bonds and
Bt
Pt
= bt are real domestic bonds. The crucial
assumption in this model is that agents face borrowing constraints on the world market. As the
foreign lenders are not able to fully repossess their funding, debt and its services are guaranteed
as repayable up to a certain fraction of the collateral value (limited liability constraint). The
5As the bigger fraction of durables is represented by residential housing, non-tradability is an empirically plausible
assumption.
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collateral corresponds to the future value of the durable good Pt+1Zt+1Dt. To formalize this idea
let´s assume that domestic households face the following period-by-period borrowing constraint on
foreign nominal debt:
Rnt B

t  
 Etf
Pt+1
et+1
Zt+1Dtg (8)
which states that the debt repayment service in foreign currency (the currency of the lender),
needs to be less or equal to the expected foreign-currency value of the collateral. Constraint 8 can
arise in presence of limited enforcement without default6. In equilibrium debt repudiation never
occurs as the lender would repossess the whole collateral value. Collateral is in fact used as a
promise for repayment. The parameter 
 is the fraction of the future value of the collateral that is
guaranteed to be repaid and can be interpreted as a down payment. Hence 
 reects the degree of
information asymmetry, of nancial market integration and of debt repossession ability of foreign
lenders which in turn depends upon legal and institutional arrangements. In general it is assumed
that it is costly for foreign lenders to repossess the entire collateral value. Since increasing 
 allows
to relax the borrowing limit and to increase the availability of foreign lending, we assume that
higher degree of nancial liberalization is associated with higher value of 
:
Once again it is convenient to re-state the constraint in real terms:
Rn;t b

t  
Etf
t+1Zt+1Dt
et+1
et
g (9)
where et
Bt
Pt
= bt are real international bonds. From equation 9 it is clear that uctuations in
the real exchange rate inuence the link between collateral and net asset accumulation: a real ex-
change rate depreciation can increase the value of collateral and ease the borrowing constraint. Lets
assume that assume a separable utility. Households choose the set of processes fCt; Nt; bt; bt ; Dtg1t=0
taking as given the set of processes fPt; Wt; Rnt ; Rnt ; Ztg1t=0 and the initial wealth b0; b0; D0 so as
to maximize 1 subject to7 and 9. Lets dene Uc;tt as the lagrange multiplier on 9: The following
optimality conditions must hold:
Uc;t
Wt
Pt
=  Un;t (10)
6Perri [70] in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics claries that default occurs in equilibrium when limited
enforcement is coupled with other frictions.
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Uc;t = Et

Rnt
t+1
Uc;t+1

(11)
Uc;t  Rnt tUc;t = Et

Uc;t+1
et+1
et
Rnt
t+1

(12)
ZtUc;t   
Uc;ttEt
(
t+1Zt+1
et+1
et
)
+ U 
Dt
 (
Dt  Dt 1
Dt 1
) (13)
= Et

U 
Dt+1
(1 +  (
Dt+1  Dt
Dt
) +
 
2
(Dt+1  Dt)2
D2t
)

+ (1  ) Et fZt+1Uc;t+1g
Equation 10 gives the optimal choice of labor supply. Note that in this context the borrowing
constraint does not a¤ect directly the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure. Equation 11 is the rst order condition on domestic bond holding. Equation 12 is the
rst order condition with respect to foreign bonds and it can be interpreted as a modied Euler
condition; a binding borrowing constraint (which implies a positive t) induces a intratemporal
distortion in the value of consumption between two di¤erent dates
Equation 13 is the e¢ ciency condition for the intertemporal choice of the durable good. The
intuition for this equation is as follows. The time t marginal cost of foregoing one unit of non-
durable consumption (weighted by the price of the durable) is equated to its marginal gain which
has three components. The rst is the direct marginal utility of one additional unit of durable
investment now and in the future:
Et

 
Dt+1
(1 +  (
Dt+1  Dt
Dt
) +
 
2
(Dt+1  Dt)2
D2t

(14)
The second is the expected marginal utility of one unit of non-durable consumption postponed into
the future:
(1  )Et fZt+1Uc;t+1g (15)
If the agent shifts today one unit of consumption from non-durable to durable goods, by ac-
quiring more collateral, he can increase his debt availability which in turn raises future consumption
demand for non-durables.
The third component of the marginal gain is given by the shadow value of relaxing the liability
constraint, 
Uc;ttEt

t+1Zt+1
et+1
et

, as an additional unit of collateral becomes available. From equa-
tion 13 it stands clear that a binding borrowing constraint induces an intertemporal distortion of
10
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magnitude 
Uc;ttEt

t+1Zt+1
et+1
et

in the value of durable consumption between two di¤erent dates.
Such wedge behaves as a tax on durable goods and changes in its magnitude can shift consumption
from durable to non-durable goods. An increase in the parameter 
 has both a direct and an
indirect impact on this wedge. Those two e¤ects move actually in opposite directions. The direct
impact comes form the fact that the size of the wedge itself depends upon 
: A higher value of this
parameter increases credit availability therefore acting as a positive wealth shock that reduces the
demand for collateralizable durable goods. In other words an increase in 
 increases the tax on
durable good, as it reduces the marginal benet of durable relative to non-durable at the current
date. The indirect impact comes from the fact a higher value of 
; by relaxing the borrowing limit,
reduces the size of t. As the shadow value of the borrowing limit decreases, the marginal benet
of one additional unit of collateral today increases. As t enters the durable tax component; a
decrease in t will induce agents to substitute non-durable with durable consumption goods. Later
on, our quantitative simulations will show that the rst e¤ect tends to prevail so that, in response
to shocks, we observe an increase in the volatility of non-durable consumption and a decrease in
the volatility of durable consumption.
3.2 Foreign Households
The rest of the world can be thought as approximating a continuum of countries whose trade
balance is zero. This implies that P f;t = P

t : Agents in the rest of the world behave as standard
consumption smoother. Let´s dene  as the discount factor of foreign residents. This implies that
the following consumption Euler condition holds:
Uc;t = Et

Rnt
t+1
Uc;t+1

(16)
Nominal interest rate in the rest of the world are exogenously given; they can become time-
varying when modeled as random shocks. Furthermore foreign households face the following optimal
demand for domestic goods:
Ch;t = 
Y t

P h;t
P t
 
(17)
11
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3.3 Open Economy Relations
It is assumed that the law of one pice holds continuously so that Ph;t = etP h;t and Pf;t = etP

f;t
where et is the nominal exchange rate. Given the denition for the terms of trade and the CPI
index, the following equation for the CPI ination (for non-durable goods) holds:
t = h;t

+ (1  )S1 t
 1
1 

+ (1  )S1 t 1
 1
1 
(18)
The real exchange rate is given by:
qt =
h
 (St)
 1 + (1  )
i 1
1 
= g(St) (19)
3.4 Non-durable Goods Production Sector
Firms in the non-durable production sector are monopolistic competitive and face Rotemberg [75]
adjustment costs. They produce di¤erent varieties of goods according to the following production
function:
Yt(i) = Ah;tNh;t (i)
As non-durable goods are aggregated according to the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators Ch;t R 1
0 [Ch;t(i)
" 1
" di]
"
" 1 and Cf;t 
R 1
0 [Cf;t(i)
" 1
" di]
"
" 1 rms face the following demand function:
Yt(i) =

Ph;t(i)
Ph;t
 "
Yt (20)
Firms choose the path of prices Ph;t (i) to maximize expected discounted future prots:
E0
( 1X
t=0
0;t
 
Yt(i)Ph;t (i) WtNh;t (i)  !
2

Ph;t (i)
Ph;t 1 (i)
  1
2
Ph;t
!)
subject to the demand constraint in 20, with t;t+1  0;t+10;t  Et
n
1
1  t
t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1
o
being the
borrowers stochastic discount factor and with !2

Ph;t(i)
Ph;t 1(i)
  1
2
Ph;t representing rms costs of
adjusting prices. The parameter ! represents slugginesh in price adjustment. Let´s dene mch;t as
12
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the lagrange multiplier on constraint 20. After imposing symmetry and substituting for the labour
market equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following optimality condition for prices:
! (h;t   1)h;t = Ah;tNh;t"

(1  ")
"
+
1
Ah;t
 UN;t
UT;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 

(21)
+!Et
8<:

1
1   t

Uc;t+1
Uc;t
"
+ (1  )S1 t
+ (1  )S1 t+1
# 1
1 
(h;t+1   1)h;t+1
9=;
3.5 Durable Goods Production Sector
Firms in the durable goods production sector solve a similar maximization problem than rms in
the non-durable sector. Hence optimal pricing condition reads as follows:
!d (d;t   1)d;t = Ad;tNd;t"

(1  ")
"
+
1
Zt
 UN;t
Uc;tAd;t

(22)
+!dEt

1
1   t

Uc;t+1
Uc;t
Zt+1
Zt
(d;t+1   1)d;t+1

3.6 Government Budget Constraint
There is a passive scal authority who issues bonds to cover the budget decit. Hence the govern-
ment budget constraint reads as follows:
Bt  Rnt 1Bt 1 = gt    t (23)
3.7 Market Clearing
Given that labor is immobile across countries, labor market clearing implies:
Nd;t +Nh;t = Nt (24)
For good markets to be cleared in country h; total purchases of durable goods must equalize
total domestic production:
Ad;tNd;t = Dt   (1  )Dt 1 + !d
2
(d;t   1)2 (25)
As non-durables are traded market clearing requires that total production is equalized to
domestic and foreign demand:
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Ah;tNh;t = Yt

Ph;t
Pt
 
+ (1  )Y t

P h;t
P t
 
+
!
2
(h;t   1)2 + gt (26)
where gt represents exogenous government spending and follows a AR(1) shock.
3.8 UIP and Asset Evolution
The arbitrage condition between domestic government claims and foreign bond holdings, equations
11 and 12, implies the following uncovered interest rate parity:
Rnt = R
n
t
h
t + Et
n
et+1
et
Uc;t+1
t+1Uc;t
oi
h
Et
n
Uc;t+1
t+1Uc;t
oi (27)
The evolution of foreign debt is obtained by the aggregate budget constraint of the domestic
residents:
Ct+Zt (Dt  Dt 1(1  ))+WtNt
Pt
+
h;t
Pt
+
d;t
Pt
 Rnt 1
bt 1
t
+ bt   t
Pt
= bt  Rnt 1
et
et 1
bt 1
t
(28)
Substituting the expression for the prot functions, h;tPt +
d;t
Pt
; and imposing the government
budget constraint, deliver:
Ah;tNh;t 	!
2
(h;t   1)2  gt+Zt(Ad;tNd;t  !n
2
(d;t   1)2) + Un;t
Uc;t
Nt = b

t  Rnt 1
et
et 1
bt 1
t
(29)
Equations 9 and 29 together clarify the link between durable prices and net asset accumulation.
The level of net asset accumulation depends on the value of collateral as from equation 9, while its
accumulation is linked to current account decits by equation 29. Notice that the dependence of
net asset accumulation on the stock of durable, which is a state variable, amplies the persistence
of uctuations in the current account.
By merging the market clearing conditions, equations 25 and 26, with the expression for net
asset accumulation, equation 29, one obtains a relation linking the net asset accumulation to the
determinants of net exports (derivations are shown in Appendix 1):
bt  Rnt 1
et
et 1
bt 1
t
= (1  )Ct
Sth
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
  Ct (1  ) S
1 
t
+ (1  )S1 t
 (30)
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The term (1  )Ct S

t
[(+(1 )S1 t )]
1
1 
represents the exports toward the rest of the world,
while the term Ct (1  ) S
1 
t
(+(1 )S1 t )
represents imports. The above relation states that in
equilibrium the net asset accumulation must equate net exports.
4 Uniqueness and Stationarity of Long Run Asset Position
Proposition 1. Under the following assumptions:1.The Hessian of the utility function is semi-
denite negative and Inada conditions for consumption hold. 2. the discount factor of domestic
agents is lower than that of foreign households, ;  2 (0; 1) and  < 7:3. The production
function, F (N); is homogeneous of degree 1 with F 2 C2; FN > 0; FNN  0: Moreover F (0) = 0;
limN!0 F 0 (N) = +1; limN!1 F 0 (N) = 0:In a close neighborhood of the steady state, the collateral
constraint:
Rn;t b

t  
Etf
t+1Zt+1Dt
et+1
et
g (31)
is binding at any date and any state and determines uniquely the net asset position.
Proof. Following Becker [9] and Becker and Foias [10], [11] we can show that the constraint
31 binds if there exist a dominant consumer, namely a patient household willing to lend. Consider
the Euler condition of domestic residents with respect to foreign lending:
1 Rnt t = Et

Uc;t+1
Uc;t
et+1
et
Rnt
t+1

(32)
By evaluating equation 32 at the steady state and substituting the steady-state relation Rn =
1
 (which is obtained by the steady state version of equation 16), we obtain:
   =  > 0 (33)
As the lagrange multiplier is positive, the constraint is binding at the steady state. Hence the
net asset position of the small open economy is uniquely determined by the borrowing constraint.
Corollary. The net asset position does not posses unit roots.
7This assumption is equivalent to assume that in steady state R  1: As it is known in the savings literature
(see Aiyagari [1]), utility functions with positive third derivatives generate precautionary savings. Additionally
precautionary saving motives arise in presence of liquidity constraints, see Zeldes [86], Jappelli and Pagano [43],
Deaton [30]. Precautionary saving is sustainable only with a steady state in which R  1: Iacoviello [41] shows that
such an assumption coupled with the assumption of small shocks guarantees that in equilibrium the constraint binds.
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As the Euler condition in the steady state, 33, does not depend on initial conditions but solely
on model parameters, the net asset position does not posses unit roots.
The above results move a step forward in understanding the conditions for stationarity of
the current account. In a seminal work, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [66] have shown that under market
incompleteness the steady state of an open economy model is characterized by unit roots. This
implies that the steady state depends on initial values and transient shocks have long run e¤ects.
In previous works several methods have been proposed to recover stationarity: parameter and func-
tional form restrictions (see Cole and Obstfeld [26], Corsetti and Pesenti [27]), endogenous discount
factor (Uzawa-type preferences), debt-elastic interest-rate premium, convex portfolio adjustment
costs (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [78]) or the assumption of nitely lived agents (see Ghironi
[39]). Notice that imposing collateral constraints is iso-morphic to the introduction of debt elastic
interest rates, as the wedge, induced by the collateral constraint on the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption at two di¤erent dates, behaves as a risk premium. However, while debt
elastic interest rates require an exogenously imposed long run level of external assets, collateral
constraints require xing the debt to asset ratios, a value which can be more easily calibrated from
the data.
5 The Transmission of Shocks
Before turning to the evaluation of di¤erent exchange rate regimes and to the optimal policy design,
it is instructive to characterize the transmission mechanism in our model under oating exchange
rates. We do that by looking at impulse response analysis under two shocks: productivity and
global liquidity shocks. We have chosen to consider a productivity shock as this is the main source
of business cycle uctuations. We have chosen to consider a global liquidity shock as empirical
evidence has shown that this shock has had a signicant role in explaining house price movements
and in accounting for global imbalances8. Furthermore in a model with sticky prices, an interest
rate shock plays also the role of a demand shock.
8See for instance Sousa and Zaghini 2006, Rä¤er and Stracca 2006, Belke, Orth and Setzer 2008.
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5.1 Calibration
In this section we analyze the response of the economy to shocks with the goal of comparing
alternative monetary policy regimes under di¤erent degrees of nancial globalization. Calibration
is set as follows.
Preferences. Time is measured in quarters. We assume that  < ,  = 0:98 (see Krusell and
Smith [51]) and  = 0:99: The structure of the model implies that the real interest rate of the rest
of the world is pinned down by the patient consumers, hence it is equal to 1 : Utility is separable
in aggregate consumption, CI;t and labour, Nt; and takes the following form:
C1 I;t
1    
N1+t
1+ :The
parameter  is set equal to 1 as in most of the RBC literature. The parameter  is set equal to 1
and the parameter  is chosen so as to generate a steady state employment of 0.3 in the non-durable
sector.
Production. The elasticity of substitution for di¤erent varieties, "; is set to 8. This implies
a mark-up of about 15 percent. In order to parameterize the degree of price stickiness !, we
observe that, by log-linearizing equation 21 we can obtain an elasticity of ination to real marginal
cost (normalized by the steady-state level of output)9 that takes the form " 1! . This allows a
direct comparison with empirical studies on the New Keynesian Phillips curve such as Galí and
Gertler [37] and Sbordone [73] using a Calvo-Yun approach. In those studies, the slope coe¢ cient
of the log-linear Phillips curve can be expressed as (1 
b#)(1 b#)b# , where b# is the probability of not
resetting the price in any given period in the Calvo-Yun model. For any given values of ", which
entails a choice on the steady-state level of the markup, we can thus build a mapping between the
frequency of price adjustment in the Calvo-Yun model 1
1 b# and the degree of price stickiness # in
the Rotemberg setup. The recent New Keynesian literature has usually considered a frequency of
price adjustment of four quarters as realistic. Recently, Bils and Klenow [16] have argued that the
observed frequency of price adjustment in the U.S. is higher, and in the order of two quarters. As a
benchmark, we parameterize 1
1 b# = 4, which implies b# = 0:75. Given " = 8, the resulting stickiness
parameter satises # = Y
b# (" 1)
(1 b#)(1 b#)  27, where Y is steady-state output.
The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign consumption, ; is set to 3. Empirical
9To produce a slope coe¢ cient directly comparable to the empirical literature on the New Keynesian Phillips curve
this elasticity needs to be normalized by the level of output when the price adjustment cost factor is not explicitly
proportional to output, as assumed here.
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studies assign values to this parameter that range from 2 to 5. The share of home consumption
goods in the domestic country, ; is set to 0:7; which implies, compatibly with empirical evidence
for industrialized countries, a degree of openness of 0.3:
Durables. The elasticity of substitution between durable and non-durable goods is set equal
to 1, while the share of durable spending is set to 0:2; a value consistent with industrialized
countries. Consistently with Erceg and Levin [33] the parameter  in the adjustment cost function
is set to 300: This value allows to obtain a volatility for durable goods higher than the one for
non-durable, as suggested by empirical evidence. The quarterly depreciation rate of the durable
stock is set to  = 0:39764; this value is consistent with a specication of the durable investment
which includes both consumer durables and residential investment: The baseline parameter that
denes the tightness of the endogenous borrowing limit is set consistently with loan to value ratios
for the industrialized countries over the period 1952-200510 which is 0.25. This parameter is varied
in the simulations in order to assess the role of nancial globalization.
Stochastic processes. Following Prescott [71] and McCallum and Nelson [57] the standard
deviation of the productivity shock is set to 0:007 and its persistence is set to 0:95. Log-government
consumption evolves according to the following exogenous process, ln

gt
g

= g ln

gt 1
g

+ "gt ;
where the steady-state share of government consumption, g; is set so that gy = 0:25 and "
g
t is an
i.i.d. shock with standard deviation g. Empirical evidence in Perotti [68] suggests g = 0:008 and
g = 0:9. We also introduce a global liquidity shock and interpret it as a shock to the aggregate
process of money supply in the rest of the world. As such we formalize it as an AR(1) shock to
foreign interest rate with r = 0:00623 and r = 0:6. Such calibration is consistent with estimates
of the interest rate process conducted by Rudebusch [76] and [77].
Monetary Policy regimes. There is an active monetary policy. The monetary authority sets
the short term nominal interest rate by reacting to endogenous variables as in the general class of
the Taylor rules:
Rnt = (
h;t
 
h
)$(
et
et 1
)
$e
1 $e (34)
where Rnt = Rt
Pt+1
Pt
; $ is the weight the monetary authority puts on the deviation of ination
from the target
 
;$e is the weight that the monetary authority puts on the deviation of the
10See IMF Report 2008.
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exchange rate between two subsequent periods. We assign a value of 2 to the parameter $: We
have chosen to target the change in the exchange rate, etet 1 ; rather than the level, as this enlarges
the determinacy region as shown by Benigno, Benigno and Ghironi [13]. A regime of pure oating
exchange rate is identied by the case $e = 0: Pegged exchange rate regimes are identied by a
Taylor rule of the form 34 in which $e > 0: This parameter will be varied in the simulations from
a low value of 0 to a high value of 0.911.
5.2 Dynamic Responses to Shocks
Figure 1 shows the dynamic response of selected variables to a 1% productivity shock in the
domestic economy. As it is standard in sticky prices models, output increases while ination
decreases. As technology has improved and since prices are sticky, rms save on labour demand,
hence employment falls. The increase in output brings about an increase in non-durable and
durable consumption demand. The response of durables shows an hump-shaped dynamic due to
the presence of adjustment costs. The increase in durables is accompanied by a fall in its price.
Overall, however, the future value of durables (the value of collateral) increases. The increase in
the value of collateral allows to relax the borrowing constraint and to increase the supply of foreign
debt, as it is shown by the fact that the lagrange multiplier deviates from zero. As consumption
demand is higher than output, domestic residents increase their demand for foreign debt. In
equilibrium foreign lending increases. The ensuing current account decit induces a real exchange
rate depreciation. Notice that such movements of the current account are consistent with a couter-
cyclical net exports dynamic, a fact well established in international data. Importantly the current
account decit (which is the counterpart of the foreign debt accumulation) shows a persistent
dynamic. This is the sense in which our model can generate persistent global imbalances, despite
the long run stationarity featured by the current account dynamic.
Figure 2 shows impulse response of selected variables to 1% global liquidity shocks. Several
empirical studies have shown a link between housing demand (or durable demand) and the increase
in global liquidity. We therefore analyze the property of an increase in global liquidity, interpreted
a fall in foreign interest rate. The availability of foreign lending increases in this case. This
11 It is not possible to quantify this parameter empirically since the classication between oating and pegged
exchange rate regimes is only done at a qualitative level. For this reason its value is varied in the experiments.
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relaxes the borrowing constraint, therefore increasing the demand for both, durable and non-durable
consumption. Such an increase is accompanied by an increase in domestic prices, Ph;t; which renders
domestic goods less attractive. The ensuing switching expenditure e¤ect implies a fall in foreign
prices, Pf;t; and an exchange rate appreciation. Overall the CPI price index falls, as exports fall
by more than the increase in domestic demand. The fall in aggregate demand induces a fall in
employment and output. Hence while benecial on consumption demand such an ease in global
liquidity has a detrimental e¤ect on output.
6 Exchange Rate Regimes and Financial Globalization
We now turn to the evaluation of the stabilization properties of exchange rate pegs under di¤erent
degrees of nancial globalization. A rst step in this direction consists in analyzing the impact of
an increase in the degree of nancial globalization for the dynamic of our economy. Recall that
we interpret nancial globalization as an increase in the parameter 
: As debt in this economy
is denominated in foreign currency, exchange rate uctuations will have an impact on the value
of collateral and through this on the dynamic of foreign debt and of other macro variables. The
higher is the degree of nancial globalization, the higher is the destabilizing e¤ect that exchange
rate uctuations have on foreign debt and the macro-economy. The combined e¤ect of nancial
globalization and exchange rate uctuations on foreign debt can be analyzed through the lenses of
the following two e¤ects:
1) Wedge/substitution e¤ect. Consider an expected exchange rate appreciation. A fall in the
exchange rate should increase the future value of collateral relative to the value of debt services,
as shown by the collateral constraint, Rn;t bt  
tEtft+1Zt+1Dtet+1
et
g: As it stands clear from equation
13, when an additional unit of collateral becomes available the shadow value of relaxing the lia-
bility constraint, 
Uc;ttEt

t+1Zt+1
et+1
et

, changes. This shadow value represents an intertemporal
distortion in the value of durable consumption between two di¤erent dates. Such wedge behaves
as a tax on durable goods and changes in its magnitude can shift consumption from durable to
non-durable goods at the current date. An increase in the paramter 
 has both a direct and an
indirect impact on this wedge. Those two e¤ects move actually in opposite directions. The direct
impact comes form the fact that the size of the wedge itself depends upon 
: A higher value of
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this parameter increases credit availability therefore acting as a positive wealth shock that reduces
the demand for collateralizable durable goods. In other words an increase in 
 increases the tax
on durable good, 
Uc;ttEt

t+1Zt+1
et+1
et

; as it reduces the marginal benet of durable relative to
non-durable at the current date. The indirect impact comes from the fact that a higher value of

; by relaxing the borrowing limit, reduces the size of t. As the shadow value of the borrowing
limit decreases the marginal benet of one additional unit of collateral today increases. As t enter
the durable tax component, a decrease in the lagrange multiplier will induce agents to substitute
non-durable with durable consumption goods. Quantitatively the rst e¤ect seems to prevail, as,
while the sensitivity of non-durable consumption increases when 
 increases, the contrary is true
for the demand in durable goods. The increase in consumption volatility feeds into output and
ination, therefore destabilizing the whole economy.
3) Valuation e¤ect. An exchange rate appreciation, by increasing the real value of collateral,
increases the borrowing capacity at the extensive margin. Such valuation e¤ect works in the same
direction as the wealth e¤ect, hence overall it tends to increase non-durable consumption volatility.
This in turn increases the volatility of output and ination as discussed previously.
Overall, it seems that increasing nancial globalization tends to exacerbate the e¤ects of
exchange rate uctuations and to destabilize the whole economy. Having established such link, the
policy maker in our economy faces a trade-o¤ in terms of ination versus exchange rate targeting.
On the one side, an exchange rate peg, accompanied to an increase in capital ows, tends to
reduce the ability of the monetary authority to stabilize output and ination. Such an e¤ect,
rst formalized in the Mundell-Fleming model, is known as the impossible trinity. On the other
side, higher nancial globalization tends to exacerbate the destabilizing e¤ects of exchange rate
uctuations on the whole economy and, because of this, calls for more aggressive exchange rate
target. In our model the second e¤ect tends to prevail as shown in Figure 9, 9 and 9. The three
gures show the volatility (in percentage values) of output, ination and (non-durable) consumption
for di¤erent degrees of nancial globalization and exchange rate target. To compute volatility we
consider all three shocks (productivity, government expenditure and foreign interest rate). The
gures show that the volatility of the three variables considered increases whenever the degree
of nancial globalization increases and decreases whenever the monetary authority increases the
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weight on exchange rates. The monetary authority can minimize the volatility of all three variables
by applying an exchange rate target around 0.8.
7 Optimal Exchange Rate Policy
We now turn to the design of the optimal policy plan which involves also the determination of the
optimal exchange rate policy. We proceed in two steps. First, we highlight the role of wedges and
trade-o¤s in our framework. We then compare the constrained pareto optimum solution and the
competitive equilibrium for a simplied economy. Finally we examine the quantitative properties
of the optimal plan; we focus on the optimal volatility of the exchange rate.
7.1 The Policy Trade-o¤s and the Constrained Pareto Optimum
Our model economy features two set of distortions. The rst set includes all nominal distor-
tions, which are given by price adjustment costs in both production sectors, !d2 (d;t   1)2 and
!
2 (h;t   1)2 : Nominal distortions entail a gap between the exible price allocation and the sticky
price allocation and can be o¤set by setting net ination equal to zero in both sectors. This out-
come can also be achieved by setting to zero the change in the domestic aggregate price index PI;t:
The second set of distortions are given by two wedges associated with the collateral constraints.
The rst is a wedge on the marginal rate of substitution between non-durable consumption at two
di¤erent dates, while the second is a wedge on the marginal rate of substitution between durable
and non-durable goods. Both wedges can be a¤ected by the policy makers via the manipulation of
the nominal exchange rate. Lets examine those wedges more closely.
Lets dene Rct =
Uc;t
Et
n
Uc;t+1
et+1
et
1
t+1
o as the householdsintra-temporal price of consumption.
When the constraint, (9), binds, households face the following endogenous nance premium:
EtfRct  Rnt g
Rnt
=
Uc;tt
Et
n
Uc;t+1
et+1
et
1
t+1
o (35)
This implies that it is now more costly and that a higher premium is required to perform
a shift in consumption between two di¤erent dates. The premium is, indeed, a wedge between
the marginal rate of substitution on consumption at two di¤erent dates and the rate of return on
safe assets. The policy maker would like to o¤set this distortion in the long run and reduce its
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uctuations in the short run. As uctuations in the nance premium are related to uctuations
in the exchange rate and in the CPI ination rate, one way to achieve such a goal is to target
the exchange rate. Recall that also uctuations in the CPI are linked to uctuations in the real
exchange rate, as shown by equation 18.
The second wedge, induced by the presence of the collateral constraint, a¤ects the marginal
rate of substitution between durable and non-durable goods, as summarized by equation 13, and
is given by the following term:
Wedgec;d = 
Uc;ttEt
(
t+1Zt+1
et+1
et
)
(36)
Notice that the size and the uctuations of this wedge can be reduced by targeting the nominal
exchange rate alongside with the CPI. To summarize, both wedges can be o¤set by controlling
movements in the exchange rate.
Overall the policy maker would like to smooth uctuations in foreign lending, as they reduce
the extent to which households can improve their consumption smoothing possibilities. As explained
before, uctuations in foreign lending are jointly determined by equations 30 and 9. Both equations
highlight a clear link between uctuations in external debt and the nominal exchange rate.
Generally speaking the policy maker is confronted with the following trade-o¤: on the one
side nominal rigidities require focusing on stabilization of domestic ination, with no attention to
uctuations in the nominal exchange rate, on the other side, wedges associated with the presence
of collateral constraints, can be made inoperative by targeting the nominal exchange rate.
It is important to notice that the policy maker does not face any incentive to use exchange rate
uctuations to render state contingent the collateral constraint. This would, indeed, be the case if
the foreign debt was limited by a constant: the policy maker could use uctuations in the exchange
rate to ease the borrowing constraints in times of negative shocks. On the contrary, the collateral
constraint is state contingent by construction, hence the policy maker only faces an incentive to
smooth uctuations in the value of external debt.
To highlight the role of the collateral constraint for the design of optimal monetary policy
it is instructive to derive the constrained pareto optimal allocation for the economy under exible
prices. In this case all (gross) ination rates are set equal to one and the change in the nominal
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exchange rate can be written as follows: et+1et =
qt+1
qt
= g(St+1)g(St) . To simplify calculations, it is
also assumed that adjustment costs on durables are zero. Under those assumptions, the planner
of the small open economy maximizes households utility subject to the current account dynamic
given by equation 30, to the collateral constraints, 9, and to the accumulation of durable goods,
Xt = Dt   (1   )Dt 1. For given foreign real interest rate, Rt ;the planner optimization problem
reads as follows:
MaxCt;Dt;bt ;StEt
( 1X
t=0
tU(Ct; Dt; Nt)
)
subject to the resource constraint given by equation 30, the collateral constraint given by
equation 9 and the equation for the accumulation of durable goods, Xt = Dt   (1   )Dt 1:Lets
dene t as the Lagrange multiplier on 30, t as the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint,
9, t ; as the Lagrange multiplier on the accumulation of durable. Furthermore, it is convenient to
dene the following functions: h(St) =
(1 )St
[(+(1 )S1 t )]
1
1 
and k(St) =
(1 )S1 t
(+(1 )S1 t )
. First order
conditions with respect to the following set of variables Ct; Dt; bt ; St read as follows:
Uc;t   tk(St) = 0 (37)
UD;t   t
Etf
Zt+1
g(St+1)
g(St)
g = 0 (38)
t   Et(t+1Rt
g(St+1)
g(St)
) + tR

t = 0 (39)
t
Etf
Zt+1Dt
g(St+1)Rt
gg(St) + t 1
Et 1f
ZtDt 1g(St 1)
Rt 1
g 1
g(St)2
g(St)  th(St)  tk(St) = 0 (40)
Merging equations 37, 38 and 39 delivers:
UD;t
Uc;t
= [(1  )] Et

t+1
	  
EtfZt+1Uc;t+1
Uc;t
k(St)
k(St+1)
g   t +


k(St)Rt
EtfZt+1 g(St)
g(St+1)
g
The corresponding competitive equilibrium faces a marginal rate of substitution between
durable and non-durable consumption which reads as follows:
UD;t
Uc;t
= [(1  )   
] Et

Zt+1
Uc;t+1
Uc;t

  Zt   

Rt
EtfZt+1 g(St)
g(St+1)
g (41)
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Two considerations arise. First, one condition for the equivalence between the competitive
economy and the constraint pareto optimal allocation is obtained by setting, at each point in time,
the value of one unit of durable consumption, measured in utils, equal to the shadow value of
durable goods, namely t = ZtUc;t. The comparison between the marginal rate of substitution
in the planner economy and the competitive economy sheds light on the planner behavior, who
internalizes the e¤ects that changes in the relative prices across countries have on the value of
collateral and on the marginal rate of substitution between durable and non-durable consumption.
7.2 Quantitative Properties of the Ramsey (Optimal) Monetary Policy
Given that higher nancial globalization tends to exacerbate the destabilizing e¤ects of exchange
rate uctuations, should the monetary authority optimally stabilize the exchange rate? In models
with sticky prices, the main distortion faced by the monetary authority is given by the cost of
ination uctuations. Nominal frictions call for pure ination targeting, with no weight assigned to
either output uctuations or to exchange rate uctuations. This is the prescription advanced both
in closed12 and open economy model13. However in our model the planner faces a trade-o¤ between
stabilizing ination and stabilizing the exchange rate, as, in presence of high nancial globalization,
the latter exacerbates ine¢ cient uctuations in consumption. Hence the planner might want to
deviate from full price stability and trade-o¤s ination volatility with exchange rate stabilization.
We analyze the design of optimal monetary policy following the Ramsey approach14. The
optimal policy is determined by a monetary authority that maximizes the discounted sum of utilities
of all agents given the constraints of the competitive economy. The Lagrangian describing the
optimal plan can be constructed following two alternative approaches. The rst is the primal
approach which amounts at describing the competitive equilibrium in terms of a minimal set of
relations involving only real allocations, in the spirit of the primal approach described in Lucas
and Stokey [55]. In the presence of sticky prices and borrowing constraints it is not possible to
reduce the planners problem to a maximization problem with a single implementability constraint.
12See Woodford [85], Clarida, Gali and Gertler [24] among others.
13See for instance Obsteld and Rogo¤ [67], Benigno and Benigno [12], McCallum and Nelson [58], Corsetti and
Pesenti [28] and [28], Kollman [49], Devereux and Engel [31], Clarida, Galí, and Gertler [25], Galí and Monacelli [38].
14See Ramsey [72], Atkinson and Stiglitz [3], Lucas and Stokey [55], Chari and Kehoe [?], Khan et al.[47], Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe [74] among many others.
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Hence we follow the alternative approach, which consists in maximizing agentsutility subject to
the full set of competitive economy equilibrium conditions and by keeping all prices. The optimal
policy plan for the domestic economy is determined by a monetary authority that maximizes the
discounted sum of utilities of all domestic residents:
Minfnt g1t=0 Maxfnt g1t=0 E0
( 1X
t=0
tU(CI;t; Nt)
)
(42)
given the constraints of the competitive economy represented by equations 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16,
17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27.
As constraints 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, 27 exhibit future expectations of control variables, the
maximization problem of the Ramsey planner is intrinsically non-recursive. As rst emphasized
in Kydland and Prescott [50], and then developed by Marcet and Marimon [56], a formal way to
rewrite the same problem in a recursive stationary form is to enlarge the planners state space with
additional (pseudo) co-state variables. Such variables bear the crucial meaning of tracking, along
the dynamics, the value to the planner of committing to the pre-announced policy plan.
The optimal monetary policy response to shocks is computed using second order approx-
imations15 of the rst order conditions for the recursively stationary Lagrangian problem that
characterizes the Ramsey plan. Technically one needs to compute the stationary allocation that
characterizes the deterministic steady state of the rst order conditions to the Ramsey plan. One
can then compute a second order approximation of the respective policy functions in the neighbor-
hood of the same steady state16. This amounts to implicitly assuming that the economy has been
15Second order approximation methods have the particular advantage of accounting for the e¤ects of volatility of
variables on the mean levels. See among others, K. Judd, developed by C. Sims [80], S. Schmitt-Grohe and M. Uribe
[79], F. Collard and M. Juillard [44].
16Lets assume that the system of Ramsey rst order conditions takes the following form:
Etff(yt+1; yt; yt 1; ut; )g = 0 (43)
where yt is the vector of endogenous variables (which includes both forward looking variables and pre-determined),
ut is the vector of exogenous shocks,  is vector of parameters. Lets further assume that the policy function takes
the following form:
yt = g(yt 1; ut; )
The actual policy function can then be computed using the following approximation:
yt =
 
y + 0:5g
2 + gy
^
y + guu+ 0:5(gyy(
^
y 
 ^y)
+g uu(u
 u)) + gyu(^y 
 u)
in which partial derivatives are obtained from the second order Taylor expansion of the system in 43.
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evolving and policy has been conducted around such a steady already for a long period of time (in
a timeless perspective).
To analyze the trade-o¤ between ination and exchange rate stabilization the Ramsey plan is
simulated under the three shocks considered in order to compute the implied optimal volatility of
real exchange rate and ination.
Figure 9 shows results by plotting the optimal volatility (in percentage values) of real exchange
rate and of (annual) ination for di¤erent values of the degree of nancial globalization. While
the volatility of the real exchange rate is largely stabilized for increasing values of the nancial
openness, the volatility of ination is instead increasing signicantly. Hence, when the economy
becomes more nancially globalized the trade-o¤ between ination and exchange rate stabilization
moves in favor of the latter. This is so since the wedges, induced by the presence of the collateral
constraints, become larger and more volatile, hence the policy maker faces a stronger incentive
to abate uctuations in those wedges, a goal which is achieved by ne tuning movements in the
exchange rates.
8 Conclusions
We have analyzed an economy in which consumption is nanced through foreign lending. Net
lending toward the rest of the world is constrained by a borrowing limit motivated by limited
enforcement and borrowing is secured by collateral in the form of durable goods. We demonstrate
that although this economy can generate persistent current account decit it can still deliver a
stationary equilibrium. As nancial globalization tends to exacerbate the destabilizing e¤ects of
exchange rate uctuations, the monetary authority can achieve higher stabilization and welfare by
stabilizing the exchange rate. This implies that pure ination targeting strategies might not be
fully optimal for economies with large exposure to foreign debt and signicant global imbalances,
a condition which characterized several industrialized countries in the last decade.
27
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.53
9 Appendix 1. Net asset accumulation and current account
The market clearing condition for the non-durable sector in the small open economy reads as
follows:
Ah;tNh;t = 
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 
1 
Ct + (1  )

1
St
 
Ct +
!
2
(h;t   1)2 + gt (44)
After imposing the government budget constraint, the budget constraint of the borrowers in
the small open economy reads as follows:
Ct +R
n;
t 1
et
et 1
bt 1
t
+ Zt (Dt  Dt 1(1  )) = Wt
Pt
Nt + b

t +
h;t
Pt
+
d;t
Pt
  gt (45)
Lets re-dene aggregate prots as h;t +d;t =   which read as:
  = PtAh;tNh;t + Pd;tAd;tNd;t  WtNt   Pd;t!d
2
(d;t   1)2   Ph;t!
2
(h;t   1)2
which in real terms becomes:
 
Pt
=

Ph;t
Pt

Ah;tNh;t + ZtAd;tNd;t   WtNt
Pt
  Zt!d
2
(d;t   1)2  

Ph;t
Pt

!
2
(h;t   1)2 + gt
Since Ah;tNh;t is given by equation 44 we obtain:
 
Pt
=

Ph;t
Pt
"

h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 
1 
Ct + (1  )

1
St
 
Ct +
!d
2
(h;t   1)2
#
+ gt +
+ZtAd;tNd;t   WtNt
Pt
  Zt!d
2
(d;t   1)2  

Ph;t
Pt

!
2
(h;t   1)2
Moreover using the market clearing condition for the durable sector, as from equation 25, one
obtains:
 
Pt
=

Ph;t
Pt
"

h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 
1 
Ct + (1  )

1
St
 
Ct
#
+ gt +
+Zt [Dt   (1  )Dt 1]  WtNt
Pt
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Substitute the latter expression into the households budget constraint leads to:
0 = Ct + Zt [Dt   (1  )Dt 1] +Rn;t 1
et
et 1
bt 1
t
  bt  
WtNt
Pt
 
"
Ph;t
Pt
"


+ (1  )S1 t
 
1 
Ct + (1  )

1
St
 
Ct
#
+ Zt [Dt   (1  )Dt 1]  WtNt
Pt
#
Finally after some manipulation and using the expression for the price index, Pt = Ph;t
h
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
leads to:
Rn;t 1
et
et 1
bt 1
t
  bt = (1  )Ct
Sth
+ (1  )S1 t
i 1
1 
  Ct (1  ) S
1 
t
+ (1  )S1 t

which states that the ow of external debt must equate net exports.
.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to domestic productivity shock
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to global liquidity shock (a fall in foreign interest rates).
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Figure 3: Volatitlity of output for different degrees of financial globalization and exchange rate target
Degree of financial globalization
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Figure 4: volatility of consumption for different degrees of financial globalization and exchange rate target
Degree of financial globalization
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Figure 5:volatitlity of CPI inflation for different degrees of exchange rate target and financial globalization
Degree of financial globalization
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